

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 03582

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PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652:YGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY MEETING, MARCH 7, 1978,
U.S. STATEMENT

CTB MESSAGE NO. 164

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF US STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB.
PAUL C. WARNKE AT SUBJECT MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT:

WE ARE NOW OVER SIX WEEKS INTO WHAT WE ALL HOPED WOULD
BE A VERY ACTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE PHASE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS
--A PHASE IN WHICH CONCRETE PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE ON ALL
IMPORTANT FRONTS. TODAY, MY DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO TAKE
STOCK OF WHERE WE ACTUALLY STAND.

ON WHAT IS CLEARLY A VERY COMPLICATED AND DETAILED
MAJOR ISSUE--VERIFICATION--WE HAVE PROCEEDED IN A SERIOUS
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FASHION. FOLLOWING MY DELEGATION'S PRESENTATION OF THE
REVISED UNITED STATES APPROACH TO VERIFICATION, INCLUDING
IN PARTICULAR OUR MAJOR INITIATIVE ON ON-SITE INSPECTIONS,
WE HAVE GOTTEN DOWN TO A PURPOSEFUL AND TECHNICALLY
SOPHISTICATED EXPLORATION OF THE KEY ISSUES--INTERNAL
SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS, INITIATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS,
AND RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS FOR INSPECTIONS.

OF COURSE, WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT, BY NOW, THE THREE DELEGATIONS WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED A GREATER MEASURE OF SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT THAN HAS SO FAR PROVED POSSIBLE. AND WE WOULD, OF COURSE, ALSO HAVE PREFERRED THAT THE SERIOUS WORK THAT IS TAKING PLACE NOT BE CLOUDED BY GENERALIZED AND GROUNDLESS CHARGES ABOUT MY GOVERNMENT'S MOTIVATIONS IN PROPOSING CERTAIN VERIFICATION MEASURES.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE DESIRE TO PROCEED CAREFULLY AND DELIBERATELY. THESE ARE, AFTER ALL, IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE MATTERS--AREAS IN WHICH NO GOVERNMENT CAN LIGHTLY ENTER INTO OBLIGATIONS. WE REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT, IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WE CAN ALLAY ANY GENUINE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN FIND SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS THAT SHOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND THAT WOULD SERVE THE KEY OBJECTIVE OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, WHILE APPROPRIATELY RESPECTING HOST PARTY SOVEREIGNTY. DESPITE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES, ALL THREE DELEGATIONS HAVE APPROACHED THE VERIFICATION ISSUE WITH A RECOGNITION OF THE TASK AT HAND AND A DETERMINATION TO FACE PROBLEMS--NOT TO HIDE FROM THEM.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID FOR THE ISSUES OF DURATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. OVER THE
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LAST SIX WEEKS, WE HAVE, IN FACT, MADE NO PROGRESS AT ALL IN RESOLVING THESE ISSUES. WHAT HAS BEEN LACKING, IN OUR VIEW, IS A COLLECTIVE, REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACHIEVING A WORKABLE AND SUCCESSFUL COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

I WOULD BE LESS THAN CANDID IF I DID NOT SAY THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS IS THE RELUCTANCE OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO COME TO GRIPS WITH--TO RECONCILE ITSELF TO--THESE BASIC AND UNAVOIDABLE PREREQUISITES. I WOULD LIKE THIS MORNING TO REVIEW THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL AND WORKABLE TREATY.

TURNING FIRST TO THE QUESTION OF DURATION, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE NEGOTIATE A STABLE AND DURABLE TREATY--ONE THAT WILL OBTAIN FOR OUR COUNTRIES THE BENEFITS THAT WE CAN EXPECT TO REALIZE FROM A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN; ONE THAT IS WORTHY OF THE RESPECT OF OUR OWN PEOPLES AS WELL AS OF THE REST OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY; AND ONE THAT WILL ENCOURAGE PROMPT AND BROAD ADHERENCE BY NON-NUCLEAR STATES AND EVENTUAL ADHERENCE, OR AT LEAST A

SHIFT IN ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR TESTING, BY THE NUCLEAR POWERS THAT DO NOT JOIN RIGHT AWAY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE TREATY MUST PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THOSE NUCLEAR POWERS THAT JOIN FROM THE START.

PROPOSALS THAT MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. BY PERMITTING ANY PARTY, AFTER A SPECIFIED PERIOD, TO WITHDRAW IF ITS SECURITY IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY CONTINUED TESTING BY NON-PARTIES, IT PROTECTS THE INTERESTS

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OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY. MOREOVER, BY AVOIDING AN AUTOMATIC AND ARBITRARY TERMINATION THAT WOULD BE IMPOSED WHETHER OR NOT CONDITIONS WARRANTED, AND BY ALLOWING INSTEAD FOR INDEFINITE DURATION, THE PROPOSAL SERVES THE OBJECTIVE OF A STABLE AND DURABLE TREATY. WE ONCE AGAIN CALL ON OUR SOVIET PARTNERS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE INTERESTS OF ALL THREE OF OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE WELL SERVED BY ADOPTING THIS PROPOSAL.

FOR REASONS THAT MY DELEGATION HAS OUTLINED PREVIOUSLY, AND WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE SELF-EVIDENT, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY THAT WOULD INEVITABLY SELF-DESTRUCT AFTER THREE YEARS IS NOT A REALISTIC OR WORKABLE SOLUTION. SUCH A SHORT-TERM HALT IN TESTING WOULD NOT BE WORTHY OF THE EFFORTS OF OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS, AND COULD NOT GAIN THE RESPECT AND WIDE ADHERENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

ON FEBRUARY 6, DR. MOROKHOV STATED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A DIFFERENT FORMULA, PROVIDED THAT IT IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY OF ACTION AMONG OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS IN ASSUMING

AND BEING RELEASED FROM THEIR OBLIGATIONS. MY DELEGATION
FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF
UNITY OF ACTION AS IT MAY RELATE TO THE TERMINATION OF
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OBLIGATIONS.

OF COURSE, A STATE WISHING TO EXERCISE ITS INDEPENDENT
JUDGMENT AND RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL MAY WELL ENCOUNTER
PRESSURES AGAINST TAKING SUCH ACTION, AND IT MUST RECOG-
NIZE THAT ITS DECISION COULD TRIGGER WITHDRAWAL BY OTHERS.
WE ASSUME THAT THIS IS AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET OBJEC-
TIONS TO OUR DURATION FORMULA, AND WE WONDER WHETHER
THE SO-CALLED PRINCIPLE OF UNITY OF ACTION MAY BE DESIGN-
ED, IN LARGE MEASURE, TO DILUTE THE POLITICAL BURDEN FOR
A PARTY THAT MAY WISH TO WITHDRAW BY PROVIDING THE
APPEARANCE OF A COLLECTIVE DECISION AND COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY.

IT STRIKES US AS UNREALISTIC TO USE A PROCEDURAL
MECHANISM, SUCH AS JOINT RELEASE FROM OBLIGATIONS, TO
ATTEMPT TO BLUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERMINATION OF THE
TREATY. WHAT WE ARE POSTULATING HERE IS A SITUATION IN
WHICH CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED SO SIGNIFICANTLY THAT A
PARTY FEELS COMPELLED TO END THE TREATY. UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD HARDLY BE POSSIBLE TO HIDE THE
FACT THAT A PARTICULAR PARTY HAD THE MOST PRESSING
REASONS FOR DOING SO. THE SITUATION WOULD BE ONE OF
FAR-REACHING IMPORT--AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS. CAN ANYONE REALLY
IMAGINE THE TERMINATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
TAKING PLACE WITHOUT PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION
OF THE REASONS? THIS WOULD BE THE CASE WHETHER THE
DURATION MECHANISM OF THE TREATY WAS BASED ON THE U.S.
FORMULA OR SOME FORM OF "UNITY OF ACTION".

CERTAINLY IT WOULD NOT--AND SHOULD NOT--BE EASY FOR
A PARTY TO LEAVE THE TREATY. BUT, ONCE AGAIN, WE ARE
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TALKING ABOUT A SITUATION IN WHICH A PARTY BELIEVES THAT
A SERIOUS THREAT HAS BEEN POSED TO ITS SECURITY AND THAT
THERE ARE COMPELLING GROUNDS FOR TERMINATING ITS OBLI-
GATIONS. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR A STATE CHOOSING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY WOULD
DEPEND ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES MOTIVATING

ITS DECISION, NOT ON WHETHER THE DURATION PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY CALL FOR SOME APPEARANCE OF JOINT RELEASE FROM OBLIGATIONS.

THESE ARE OUR THOUGHTS ON THE CONCEPT OF UNITY OF ACTION AS WE PRESENTLY UNDERSTAND IT. IF THESE REMARKS REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET CONCEPT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE--AFTER ALL, WE HAVE HEARD LITTLE EXPLANATION OF THE CONCEPT BY ITS ORIGINATORS.

AS WE HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING ANY SUGGESTIONS THE SOVIET SIDE MAY WISH TO MAKE THAT WOULD PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVE OF A STABLE AND DURABLE TREATY. BUT IT CONTRIBUTES LITTLE TO OUR WORK FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO SAY MERELY THAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES. AFTER ALL, IT IS THE US AND UK DELEGATIONS THAT HAVE PUT FORWARD THE ONLY WORKABLE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. IF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS TO PROPOSE, AND WISHES TO ADVANCE OUR EFFORTS ON THIS IMPORTANT NEGOTIATING FRONT, WE WOULD RECOMMEND, WITH ALL EARNESTNESS, THAT IT LOSE NO ADDITIONAL TIME IN BRINGING THEM FORWARD.

I WOULD LIKE TO TURN NOW TO WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THE

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SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACHIEVING WORKABLE TREATY PROVISIONS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TREATY REFLECT, IN A REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC WAY, THAT THE QUESTION OF CARRYING OUT SUCH EXPLOSIONS IS TO BE DEFERRED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE

POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE, THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD SEEK IN GOOD FAITH TO RECONCILE THEIR POSITIONS, THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS, AND THAT--AS LONG AS THE BAN ON WEAPONS TESTS REMAINS IN FORCE--THERE MUST REMAIN APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS ON PNES.

THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION CLEARLY DOES NOT MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. IT IGNORES THE PRESENT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ALLOWING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS UNDER AN EFFECTIVE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. INSTEAD, IN A PREJUDICIAL MANNER, IT WOULD REQUIRE THAT FUTURE WORK MUST RESULT IN AN ACCOMMODATION FOR THESE EXPLOSIONS. AND ABOVE ALL, IT CALLS FOR AN ARBITRARY TIME LIMIT, AFTER WHICH PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WOULD BE LEFT TOTALLY UNCONSTRAINED IF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF CARRYING THEM OUT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED.

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MY DELEGATION HAS STRESSED AGAIN AND AGAIN--SO AS TO ELIMINATE ANY POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING--THAT IT WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THE WEAPONS TEST BAN CONTINUING WITHOUT EITHER A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF CARRYING OUT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OR A CONTINUATION OF THE PROHIBITION ON THOSE EXPLOSIONS. SUCH AN APPROACH SIMPLY WILL NOT WORK.

WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE PROPOSED AN APPROACH THAT CAN WORK. IT WOULD ENSURE THAT, AS LONG AS THE WEAPONS TEST BAN CONTINUES, APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS--WHETHER IN THE FORM OF A MORATORIUM OR OF AGREED CONTROLS FOR EXCLUDING MILITARY BENEFITS--WOULD BE PLACED ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. AND WE HAVE PROVIDED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT AT ANY TIME TO MOVE FROM A BAN ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO THE REGULATION OF THOSE EXPLOSIONS.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THESE PROPOSALS? UNFORTUNATELY, THE RESPONSE HAS BEEN MINIMAL. ON FEBRUARY 13, DR. MOROKHOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION UNDERSTOOD THE "COMPLEXITY" OF A SITUATION IN WHICH A WEAPONS TEST BAN WOULD CONTINUE WITHOUT CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. WE WELCOME THAT UNDERSTANDING. BUT LET US BE CLEAR. THE SITUATION WOULD NOT MERELY BE COMPLEX; IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE, UNWORKABLE--AND THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE. THE SOONER THIS REALITY IS GRASPED BY OUR NEGOTIATING

PARTNERS, THE BETTER THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS.

THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CAN BE
READILY SEEN BY RECALLING OUR EXPERIENCE IN OTHER FORUMS.

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AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE, OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS HAVE OFTEN BEEN THE COMMON TARGET OF DEMANDS THAT WE TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS BY A PARTICULAR DEADLINE. WE ALL KNOW HOW WE HAVE DEALT WITH THESE DEMANDS. WE HAVE ALWAYS REJECTED THEM. NO GREAT POWER WOULD DO OTHERWISE--AND WITH GOOD REASON. DEADLINES ARE INHERENTLY ARTIFICIAL. PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED WHEN THE CONDITIONS EXIST FOR SOLVING THEM. HOW IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT THAT CONDITIONS WHICH DO NOT EXIST AT PRESENT WILL EXIST BY A SPECIFIED FUTURE DATE?

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS CONFIDENT THAT THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUDING MILITARY BENEFITS CAN BE SOLVED WITHIN THREE YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE. BUT THAT IS BECAUSE THE SOVIET DELEGATION FEELS THAT, AT PRESENT, IT ALREADY HAS DEVELOPED MEASURES THAT WOULD BE ADEQUATE. WE DO NOT AGREE THAT THESE MEASURES ARE ADEQUATE. HOW, THEREFORE, CAN WE STAKE THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES ON OUR ABILITY TO COME UP WITH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WITHIN A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF YEARS?

THE SOVIET DELEGATION MAY ASSUME THAT, BY SETTING A DEADLINE, WE WOULD BE GIVEN MUCH GREATER INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MEANS OF CARRYING OUT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. BUT AGAIN I SAY LET US FACE REALITIES. AN ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR ACHIEVING A GENUINE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION AMONG THREE IMPORTANT SOVEREIGN STATES. THE SOLUTION MUST COMMEND ITSELF, ON ITS MERITS, TO OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS.

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AND WHETHER OR NOT ANY PARTICULAR SOLUTION WILL
COMMEND ITSELF DEPENDS NOT ON DEADLINES, BUT ON OBJECTIVE
FACTORS--SUCH AS TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND OF
COURSE THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION ITSELF. THESE
FACTORS OBVIOUSLY MAY CHANGE OVER TIME. THEY MAY PERMIT
A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO BE REACHED IN THE
FUTURE. BUT THEY MAY NOT. WE CAN PLEDGE OUR GOOD FAITH
IN TRYING TO FIND A SOLUTION. BUT WE CANNOT PREDICT OR
GUARANTEE THAT FUTURE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS WILL MAKE ONE
POSSIBLE. NOR CAN WE--OR ANYONE ELSE--GUARANTEE THAT
CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO A SOLUTION WILL EXIST BY A
CERTAIN DATE.

WE HAVE NOTED THE SOVIET CONCERN THAT THE ABSENCE OF
A FIXED DEADLINE WOULD LEAD TO COMPLICATIONS IN ECONOMIC
PLANNING. TO SOME EXTENT, OF COURSE, THESE DIFFICULTIES
CAN BE AMELIORATED THROUGH CONTINGENCY PLANNING. BUT
THE BASIC UNCERTAINTIES SEEM TO US UNAVOIDABLE. THEY
ARE THE PRODUCT OF THE LOGIC OF A SITUATION IN WHICH A
GENUINE SOLUTION CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT MUTUAL CONSENT
AND CANNOT BE ARTIFICIALLY INDUCED THROUGH THE
IMPOSITION OF A DEADLINE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE TRIED TODAY, IN A FRANK AND
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REALISTIC MANNER, TO SET FORTH WHAT WE BELIEVE ARE THE
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS, IN THE AREAS OF DURATION AND
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, FOR ACHIEVING A WORKABLE AND
SUCCESSFUL COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. IN OUR OPINION, THESE
REQUIREMENTS, OR REALITIES, HAVE BEEN APPARENT FOR
SOME TIME AND THEY WILL NOT GO AWAY.

WE HAVE BEEN MEETING TRILATERALLY SINCE JULY. BUT ON
THESE TWO CRITICAL ISSUES, WE HAVE NOT MADE MEANINGFUL
PROGRESS. AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ROUND, THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION TOOK A MAJOR AND DECISIVE STEP ON THE
QUESTION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS IN THE INTEREST OF
ACCELERATING OUR WORK. THIS STEP RESULTED FROM A FUNDA-

MENTAL REASSESSMENT OF OUR VERIFICATION POSITION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL OF THE REALITIES PERTAINING TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE NOW MUST EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW CORRESPONDING REALISM AND FLEXIBILITY ON THE KEY ISSUES OF DURATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. WE THEREFORE CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND TO NEGOTIATE WITH US A SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE ONE WE HAVE PROPOSED.

THE STAKES ARE VERY CLEAR--THEY ARE WHETHER WE CAN ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. I BELIEVE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT ALL THREE OF OUR GOVERNMENTS SINCERELY DESIRE THAT WE DO SO. ALL THREE KNOW THAT SUCH A BAN WOULD HAVE MAJOR AND, WE ARE CONVINCED, PERSISTING BENEFITS--FOR OUR RELATIONS, FOR THE SECURITY OF EACH OF US, AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY. END TEXT.
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